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“Making the case for temporary migrant worker programmes: evidence from the UK’s 
rural guestworker (‘SAWS’) scheme” 
 
Dr Sam Scott, University of Gloucestershire, Cheltenham, UK, sscott@glos.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The UK has had a Temporary Migrant Worker Programme (TMWP) for agricultural 
‘guestworkers’ since 1943. Most recently referred to as the Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme (SAWS), SAWS accommodated 25,000 workers per annum by its 2004 peak. 
However, the UK government then announced the scheme’s closure (initially for 2011, but 
then delayed until 2014). This paper examines employers’ response to this closure and, 
specifically, juxtaposes the academic critiques of TMWPs with the very strong employer 
preference for them. This preference, the paper concludes, is about the way in which TMWPs 
allow labour to be more readily and more extensively controlled, and, also allow employers 
access to ‘better quality’ workers. Considering these benefits of quality and control, 
alongside the academic critiques, the paper concludes that SAWS should be retained, but 
with major changes.  
 
Key Words: Agriculture; Guestworker; Harvest; Labour; Migration; Rural, Seasonal; 
Temporary.  
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1. Introduction  
Relatively limited academic attention has been directed towards international migrants 
working in rural areas and the associated demographic and economic changes underpinning, 
and emanating from, this (Dufty-Jones, 2014). It is clear, however, that developed world 
agriculture in particular has become increasingly reliant upon low-wage, but not necessarily 
low-skilled, migrant labour. Recent publications, especially within this journal, have 
demonstrated this point across a number of different national contexts (Findlay and 
McCollum, 2013; Hanson and Bell, 2007; Rye and Andrzejewska, 2010). In all cases the 
emphasis has been on the growing recruitment of seasonal migrant farm workers employed 
primarily within the fruit and vegetable (horticultural) sectors during harvest time.  
 
In the UK a Temporary Migrant Worker (Guestworker) Programme (TMWP) has existed for 
agricultural employers since 1943. However, in early 2014 this ‘Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Scheme’ (SAWS), as it was then known, was discontinued. The closure of SAWS 
was announced in 2006 initially for 2011, but was then delayed and subject to a 2012/13 
review (Home Office, 2013). The paper explores employers’ reactions to the threatened and 
eventual closure of SAWS in the 2007-2009 period and asks specifically why a TMWP like 
SAWS has garnered so much support amongst employers but so little support elsewhere? 
Contrary to the dominant sentiment amongst academics (see for example Lenard and 
Straehle, 2012), the paper concludes that TMWPs like SAWS do have a place. This place, 
however, depends upon a new type of TMWP that is well regulated and moves beyond a 
view of workers as either ‘commodities’ and/ or rural ‘guests’ (see also Ruhs, 2006, 2013).  
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2. Temporary Migrant Worker Programmes  
Temporary Migrant Worker Programmes have been on the mainstream policy agenda of 
developed world economies since World War II, and in some countries even earlier than 
this.1 Agriculture is the sector that that has become most associated with, and most dependent 
upon, TMWPs and the so-called ‘guestworkers’ (gastarbeiter) they import. As Prebeisch 
(2010: 405) notes: “of all economic sectors, agriculture has the longest history with 
TMWPs”.  
 
The UK has had a Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, in various guises, since 1943 (Kay 
and Miles 1992; McDowell 2004; Robinson 2003).2 Elsewhere in the world, there are 
numerous SAWS equivalents (see Home Office, 2013: CH4 for a review): the Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Programme (SAWP) in Canada; the Seasonal Workers Programme 
(SWP) in Germany; the H-2A programme in the USA (formerly the H2 and bracero 
programmes); the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme in New Zeeland; and 
the Seasonal Immigration Quota Programme in Norway. Moreover, even where there are no 
specialist TMWPs, states have adjusted general visa systems accordingly. Australia, for 
example, has the Working Holiday Makers from Overseas (WHMO) visa (Robertson, 2014) 
and the Netherlands the Wet Arbeid Vreemdelingen (WAV) visa: both of which are heavily 
(but not exclusively) focused upon the recruitment of migrant harvest labour.  
 
In many countries, particular nationalities have become associated with rural food industry 
employment (see for example Maher and Cawley, 2014). There has also been a strong 
expansionist tendency since the early 1990s. SAWS, for instance, accommodated around 
                                                 
1
 TMWPs are also termed ‘circular migration’ and ‘guestworker’ programmes in the literature. 
2
 Migrant harvest labour first entered the UK in 1943 as part of the European Volunteer Workers scheme and during the 1960s the Home 
Office consolidated various programmes to forms SAWS. 
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3,000 workers per annum up until the early 1990s, but by 2004 the quota had grown to 
25,000 with a 90%+ take-up rate (Home Office, 2013: 51) (see Figure 1). Similarly, SAWP 
in Canada accommodated 6,000 temporary migrant workers in the late 1980s but now 
accommodates 27,000 (Hennebry and Preibisch, 2012), whilst the Australian WHMO scheme 
has increased from 57,000 (1997) to 85,000 (2001) (Hanson and Bell, 2007: 103) and the 
Norwegian Seasonal Immigration Quota Programme has increased from 4,000 permits (late 
1990s) to 27,000 (2007) (Rye and Andrzejewska, 2010: 42). In fact, only France appears to 
have seen a recent decline in migrant harvest labour: from around 110,000 in the 1960s to 
11,000 by 2001 (Martin, 2006: 35).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the UK, food businesses have been fierce advocates of TMWPs. The NFU, for instance, 
has campaigned for SAWS’ continuation, often with the support of DEFRA (Cabinet Office, 
2002; DEFRA, 2010; DEFRA, 2011; NFU, 2011, 2013; House of Commons 2009, 2012; 
House of Lords, 2008). Internationally, global NGOs and governance institutions (especially 
when focused on international development) have also welcomed the “guestworker 
resurrection” that Castles (2006) notes. The World Bank, for instance, has attempted to 
promote best-practice in TMWPs by highlighting, in particular, New Zeeland’s Recognised 
Seasonal Employer (RSE) programme (Gibson and McKenzie, 2010) and Canada’s Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Programme (SAWP) (Binford, 2013: 7). In a similar vein, the EU has 
broadly backed this TMWP approach and in 2005 issued a benchmark ‘Policy Plan on Legal 
Migration’ which sanctioned: “Seasonal workers for agriculture, building, and 
catering…allowed to come in for a certain number of months per year, for 4 –5 years (but 
with) no possibility of transferring to permanent employment and residence” (CEC, 2005: 6-
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8). Some academics, though still relatively few, have added to calls for the increased use of 
TMWPs, especially with respect to lower-wage workers (Ruhs, 2006, 2013; Walmsley and 
Winters, 2005; Walmsley et al., 2007).  
 
Despite this sanctioning, and at times championing, of TMWPs most academics have 
continued to raise reservations. The main ideological criticism revolves around the ways in 
which TMWPs, and therefore states, turn migrant workers into what Prebeisch (2010: 405) 
calls “non-citizen labor” and Basok (2002) “unfree labour” (drawing on Miles, 1987). Put 
another way, through TMWPs: “States seem still to be trying to import labor but not people – 
just as the Western European countries did 40 years ago” (Castles, 2006: 760). As Anderson 
(2010: 312) argues: 
“As well as a tap regulating the flow of workers to a state, immigration controls might 
be more usefully conceived as a mould constructing certain types of workers through 
selection of legal entrants, the requiring and enforcing of certain types of employment 
relations, and the creation of institutionalised uncertainty”.  
This use of immigration policy to manufacture ‘better’ low-wage workers by increasing 
levels of precarity and vulnerability has even been labeled a form of state-sponsored 
“structural violence” (Mitchell, 2011: 579). Others have called it a form of “internal 
apartheid” (Hennebry and McLaughlin, 2012: 138).  
 
What, though, are the more particular criticisms of TMWPs? Firstly, and most significantly, 
low-wage TMWPs almost always require an employer-sponsor. The Home Office (UKBA at 
the time) guidance, for example, stated that in relation to SAWS:   
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‘Participants wishing to transfer from one Operator to another, or from one farm to 
another, may only do so for exceptional reasons and only with the agreement of their 
Operator…if a SAWS participant terminates their employment they must leave the farm 
accommodation and will have to wait three months before being eligible to apply for a 
new placement’ (UKBA, 2007).  
In other words, whilst employers using SAWS needed not have given any guarantees to 
migrants over the length of their work, or how much they would have been paid, SAWS 
migrants were de facto tied to an employer for the season. To quote the NFU, SAWS 
migrants were: “guaranteed to remain on the farm during the crucial harvest period” (House 
of Lords, 2008: 35). The same ties apply to migrant harvest workers in many other countries 
(Binford, 2013; Kosegi, 2001; Lenard and Straehle, 2012).  
 
Secondly, harvest labour recruited via TMWPs is usually dependent upon employer housing 
and transport.3 The former is often of sub-standard quality and over-crowded (Hennebry, 
2012: 17; Mitchell, 2011; Scott et al., 2012) and the latter can leave migrants, especially in 
remote rural locations, entirely dependent upon their employers should they wish to leave the 
workplace. In relation to both, TMWPs effectively help blur the boundaries between work 
and social, communal and family life (Prebeisch, 2010: 415). Mitchell argues, for instance, 
that guestworkers are effectively prevented from forming “active communities” and from 
contributing to realms outside of their work and the workplace (Mitchell, 2011). 
 
Thirdly, there is confusion over whether certain TMWPs offer tax breaks to employers and 
whether, more broadly, they effectively function as a sector-based subsidy that makes 
migrant recruitment more attractive than home-grown labour recruitment. The Association of 
                                                 
3
 In the UK there was a maximum amount SAWS employers could charge for accommodation: known as the accommodation off-set. 
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Labour Providers (ALP, 2005) in the UK, for example, has stated that the tax position over 
SAWS is “unclear” but noted that it did seem to offer a form of tax-break to employers (see 
Home Office, 2003: 12).  
 
Fourthly, there is a large body of evidence showing that TMWPs are not actually temporary 
and generate increasing levels of permanent migration. Ruhs (2006: 28), for instance, 
acknowledges that TMWPs: “will always lead to pressures for permanent settlement” whilst 
other academics are more pejorative: 
“Virtually no low-wage “temporary worker” program in a high-wage liberal democracy 
has ever turned out to be genuinely temporary” (Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001: 119).   
“In the long run, there is no such thing as a temporary worker program...In many 
countries, under many types of government, and across many time periods, experiences 
with guest worker programs have led to an overwhelming and simple consensus among 
those who have studied the issue: there is nothing more permanent than temporary 
workers” (Massey and Liang, 1989: 206). 
The UK government, however, has presented robust evidence for SAWS that appears to 
contradict these views, arguing that: “the vast majority of people who come to the UK 
under SAWS go home when they are supposed to and that the number of people who fail 
to do so is minimal - in single figures” (House of Commons, 2012; Home Office, 2002). 
This may be true with respect to SAWS specifically but, more generally, TMWPs can 
underpin the development of cultures of migration beyond particular programmes and visas 
(Martin and Teitelbaum, 2001: 122-3; Massey and Liang, 1989). Indeed they are part, it is 
argued, of a more general trend towards expansionist immigration policy across the 
developed world (Castles, 2006; Freeman, 1995).  
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Fifthly, when employers are able to access plentiful supplies of cheap and productive migrant 
labour they appear less likely to invest in research and development to improve technology 
and reduce the man-hours required per unit output. Martin and Teitelbaum (2001: 124), for 
example, show very clearly that by stopping the bracero system the US government initiated 
an era of mechanisation and technological innovation because labour became more expensive 
relative to capital. In Europe, a similar relationship between the ebb and flow of cheap 
migrant labour and investments in labour-saving technology has been observed, with Hoggart 
and Mendoza (2002: 557) arguing that: “a strategy that relies on a cheap labour solution, does 
not hold out much prospect for sustainable long-term market competitiveness”. 
 
Finally, and linked to the above, TMWPs appear to depress pay and conditions. Prebeisch 
(2010: 427-8), for example, reviews the evidence for agriculture and concludes that it is: 
“overwhelming…the availability of migrant labor, regardless of the mechanism under which 
it is made available, has had a negative effect on wage levels and working conditions”. More 
specifically, this workplace intensification has been observed in the USA (Martin and 
Teitelbaum, 2001), the UK (Rogaly, 2008) and in Canada (Binford, 2013) and it seems clear 
that migrants, especially those from peripheral economies, have a different “behavioural 
code” (ibid., 62-3) to local workers (see also Scott 2013a, 2013b) that means they are 
generally “more willing to accept the industry’s working and living conditions, and less able 
to contest them” (Prebeisch, 2010: 413). 
 
The academic literature then, overall, is critical of TMWPs and especially those relating to 
low-wage workers. There is the overarching theoretical and ideological criticism of such 
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programmes: that they sanction the creation of “denizens” (Hammar, 1990) and increase 
inequality within the labour market along migrant versus non-migrant lines (Lenard and 
Straehle, 2012). Beyond this, there are also specific reservations that TMWPs: tie workers to 
employers; erode the boundaries between working lives and private lives; provide subsidies 
for employers to recruit migrant over local workers; are not as temporary as they imply; delay 
innovation as labour becomes cheaper relative to capital; and, depress pay and working 
conditions. Despite these criticisms, this paper argues that TMWPs have a place in 
contemporary migration management; though the nature of this place must, we argue, be 
subject to more critical scrutiny and debate than was evident for SAWS.   
 
3. The UK’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme 
In the UK, and also across the developed world more generally, the food industry has 
commanded a special place at the immigration policy table (see for example Hennebry and 
McLaughlin, 2012). SAWS has been around in one guise or another since 1943 – the longest 
running TMWP in UK history – and, in addition to SAWS, there have also been two other 
schemes supplying migrant workers to UK food businesses: the ‘Willing Workers On 
Organic Farms’ (WWOOF) tourist visa scheme (established in 1971) and the Sector-Based 
Scheme (SBS) for food processing (established in 2003). The latter scheme became defunct 
at the same time as SAWS, whilst the former remains in place but relates only to unpaid 
migrant volunteer workers.4 
 
All the evidence until relatively recently continued to suggest this food industry policy 
exceptionalism would continue. Back in 2001, for example, the Home Office argued that: 
                                                 
4
 The SBS for food processing was like SAWS in that it was tied to A2 immigrants until January 1st 2014. In the run up to its closure in 2014 
the SBS for food processing quota was reduced from 10,000 to 3,500 migrants per annum. 
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“There is a clear need for short-term casual labour. Although this comprises only a small 
proportion of all employment in the UK, it is important in industries such as agriculture.” 
(2001: 44). This seminal ‘Secure Borders, Safe Havens’ White Paper was a key part of early 
twenty-first century UK immigration strategy and set in motion a subsequent Home Office 
SAWS review (Home Office, 2002, 2003) and Cabinet Office commission (Cabinet Office, 
2002). 
 
The Home Office review found that: 
“SAWS is widely seen as an essential source of seasonal labour for the agriculture 
industry. It provides reliable and flexible labour which farmers and growers know in 
advance they will receive in time for planting and harvesting and can plan their 
activities accordingly. Additionally, in an industry where a considerable amount of 
illegal working exists, farmers and growers are reassured that the SAWS labour is 
legitimate.” (Home Office, 2003: 6) 
Similarly, the Cabinet Office ‘Currie Commission’ (Cabinet Office, 2002) championed 
SAWS’ expansion to a peak in 2004 of 25,000 (see Figure 1). Both reports came off the back 
of a fear that if employers could not meet their harvest labour demands through legitimate 
migration channels, such as SAWS, they would turn to clandestine workers (domestic benefit 
claimants or ‘illegal’ migrants) and/ or that crops would be left to rot. 
 
This fear was evident in UK government initiatives in the DWP (Department for Work and 
Pensions), Home Office and HMRC (Her Majesty’s Customs and Revenue) and led to drives 
to reduce both irregular work by UK ‘cash casuals’ and to reduce the level of irregular 
This is an earlier draft of: Scott, S. (2015) MakiŶg the case for teŵporary ŵigraŶt ǁorker prograŵŵes: eǀideŶce froŵ the UK͛s rural 
guestǁorker ;͚SAWS͛Ϳ scheŵe. JourŶal or ‘ural Studies 4Ϭ: ϭ-11. doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2015.05.005 
 
 
 
 11 
immigration. The fear of growing labour market informality helps to explain why SAWS, 
until its closure in 2014, continued to expand: 
 From around 3,000 workers per annum during the 1940s-1980s to 25,000 workers per 
annum by 2004 (due to the 2002 Cabinet Office ‘Curry Commission’ report that 
recommended SAWS be expanded to 50,000 workers per annum); 
 From being a scheme focused on students aged 18-25 years old to being a scheme with no 
age limit; 
 From being about attracting workers interested in cultural exchange, education, training 
to being about attracting any kind of worker; 
 From running 7-months per year to being a year-round scheme; 
 From having a maximum stay of 3-months to having a maximum stay of 6-months. 
 
Alongside this expansion, SAWS was also subject to added scrutiny: 
 SAWS Operators (there were 9 Home Office registered SAWS labour providers) had a 
voluntary Code of Practice (established in the late 1990s).5 
 This Code of Practice shaped the Home Office’s decision to require operators to fulfill 
four key responsibilities, namely to: 1) source and recruit eligible workers; 2) assess and 
monitor suitability of work placements provided; 3) ensure workers are treated fairly and 
lawfully; and 4) ensure farmers and growers are provided with people who are suitable to 
do the work on offer. 
 Workers satisfaction was also monitored via: 1) SAWS operators periodically visiting 
farms to speak to workers; 2) the Home Office periodically visiting farms to interview 
                                                 
5
 The nine SAWS operators (with their location, and 2013 SAWS quotas in parenthesis) were: Concordia (YSV) Ltd (East Sussex, 8,125), 
Wilkin and Sons Ltd (Essex, 280), Barway Services (Cambridgeshire, 1,225), Haygrove Ltd (Herefordshire, 575), HOPS Labour Solutions 
(Warwickshire, 8,100), R & J M Place  (Norfolk, 525), S & A Produce (Hereforshire, 1,500), Sastak Ltd (Shropshire, 300) and Fruitful 
(Herefordshire, 620) (see Home Office, 2013: 52-55).  
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employers and their workers. Evidence of this monitoring was never publicized as far as 
we are aware.  
 Finally, the Home Office (via the erstwhile UKBA) had an annual SAWS review meeting 
with the nine Operators, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), the Department for 
Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA).  
 
In the event we could find no evidence in any of the UK policy documents reviewed of 
SAWS failing to shine under this added scrutiny. Indeed, the most recent Home Office 
review of SAWS found it to be “extremely well managed” (Home Office, 2013: 1) and 
earlier Home Office research similarly found that “the demand to participate is very high” 
(Home Office, 2003: 11). 
 
Nevertheless, from 2006 SAWS was subject to one key restriction: it was limited to Bulgaria 
and Romania workers from 2008, following A2 accession (Home Office, 2006). This 
effectively meant that the scheme would only continue for as long as Bulgarian and 
Romanian migrants were subject to transitional restrictions i.e. a maximum of seven years 
(until January 1st 2014). The 2006 Home Office decision to end SAWS was based on a 
principle not to open Tier 3 (low skilled workers for temporary labour shortages) of the 
Points-Based System (PBS). Crucially, SAWS would have become a part of Tier 3 once it no 
longer became tied to A2 (Bulgarian and Romanian) immigrants and this was why it was 
eventually closed. In short, there was a desire not to open up any more low-wage immigration 
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from outside the EU. (Though it is worth noting here that SAWS participants were never 
technically migrants because of their 6-month maximum stay.)6 
 
In the run up to the scheme’s closure in January 2014 (formerly announced on September 
12th 2013) there have been a growing number of pro-SAWS salvos via: the DEFRA ‘Fruit 
and Vegetable Task Force’ (DEFRA, 2010), the DEFRA ‘Independent Farming Regulation 
Task Force’ (DEFRA, 2011: 57), the NFU (NFU, 2011, 2013) and MPs (House of Commons, 
2009, 2012). In addition, the 2012/13 Home Office review of SAWS, carried out by the 
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), was also broadly positive about SAWS (Home 
Office, 2013). Whilst making no specific or explicit call for SAWS’ continuation (this would 
have been beyond its remit) it is clear that the scheme was well supported and seen as a 
success by MAC. 
 
Effectively, then, SAWS had been supported and expanded in scale and scope by the Home 
Office. It had been championed by DEFRA and particularly rural Conservative MPs. 
However, a Conservative-Liberal government has overseen its closure (that was announced 
via a Labour government). This is because of the overarching principle not to allow Tier 3 
migration from outside the EU in the context of net migration that has been seen as excessive. 
As the Ministerial statement announcing the closure of SAWS on 12th September 2013 made 
clear: “Unskilled and low skilled labour needs should be satisfied from within the expanded 
EEA labour market” (Harper, 2013).  
 
4. Methodology 
                                                 
6
 The UN definition of an international migrant is someone who stays in, or intends to stay in, a host country for 12-months or more 
(Anderson and Blinder, 2012). 
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The 2006 Home Office decision to tie SAWS to A2 (Bulgarian and Romanian) workers and 
effectively end the scheme in 2014 led to considerable employer frustration and occasional 
protestation. The research into SAWS was carried out in 2007-2009 because of this. Farmers 
were consulted in two ways during this period. Firstly, the author carried out an NFU-backed 
2008 ‘Migration and Labour Shortage Survey’ that involved a consultation with 268 UK 
farmers (mostly labour-intensive horticulturalists). Secondly, during 2007-09, and sponsored 
by the Nuffield Foundation, the author conducted in-depth interviews with 30 English 
horticultural companies (37 interviewees) growing and/ or processing salad produce.  
4.1. 2008 ‘Migration and Labour Shortage Survey’ 
The ‘Migration and Labour Shortage Survey’ was sent to UK farmers on April 15th 2008 via 
the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) UK members’ network. Farmers had 10 days (until April 
25th 2008) to respond to the survey. A total of 268 useable responses were received, with 
these 268 businesses collectively employing a peak-season labour force of 28,206. The 
survey was short (2.5 sides) and contained 14 questions. No funding was provided for the 
survey and it was carried out with the principal aim of informing a research report 
commissioned by the Migration Advisory Committee (Scott et al., 2008; Geddes and Scott, 
2010). Questions 8, 12 and 13 were open-ended and this is where specific information on 
SAWS was gathered. The three key open-ended questions were as follows:  
 Q8) If you expect to find it harder to fill vacancies over the next five-years, what will be 
the impact on your business?  
 Q12) What are your views on recent/ proposed changes to SAWS? 
 Q13) Please use the space below to include any other thoughts or comments you may 
have on labour demand/ supply within UK agriculture  
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Question 8 generated 231 useable responses equating to 5,500 words; question 12 generated 
244 useable responses equating to 9,000 words; and question 13 generated 205 useable 
responses equating to 9,500 words.  
 
4.2. In-Depth Employer Interviews  
Following a Nuffield Foundation grant (No. SGS/33876.01) 37 in-depth interviews were 
carried out in 2007-2009 covering 30 horticultural salad growers/processors across England 
(Lancashire, Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire, 
Oxfordshire, Worcestershire, Hampshire, Sussex, Surrey, Kent, Essex, Buckinghamshire, 
Staffordshire and Shropshire). Recruitment was via word-of-mouth, snowballing, the use of 
producer networks and cooperatives, and the researcher’s own knowledge of the ‘key 
players’ in the industry. Some businesses were specialists (focusing on mainly one salad 
product) and some generalists (where a salad product was one product amongst many). All 30 
companies interviewed relied upon migrant workers (mainly but not exclusively from central 
and eastern Europe) to fill their temporary harvest labour vacancies. The interviews were in-
depth, lasted for between 30 minutes to two hours, and covered the following ten themes:  
1. Verbal introduction and overview of research 
2. Background, experience and current role of interviewee 
3. Company overview  
4. The overall food industry  
5. The salad industry 
6. Labour recruitment and usage 
7. Migrant labour  
8. Government and corporate policies  
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9. Future trends and challenges  
10. Life without migrant workers  
In themes 6-10, it became very apparent that SAWS was central to the sustainability of 
almost all of the horticultural growers/ processors we interviewed.  
 
5. Harvest Labour in the UK 
Before examining employers’ views on SAWS, via the survey and interview evidence, it is 
important to assess the scale of overall harvest labour demand in the UK and to determine 
SAWS’ share of this overall demand. The problem here is that the statistics are patchy. The 
data is not especially precise, with DEFRA measuring casual work on farms (via the 
Agricultural Census) but this is not the same as harvest labour per se. Moreover, even if the 
data were precise, statistics tend to relate to specific Industrial (SIC) and Occupational (SOC) 
categories and/ or to departmental responsibilities rather than to harvest labour across the 
entire food production sector.  
 
The best estimates of agricultural (i.e. excluding food processing) employment suggest that at 
present there are 476,000 workers, 177,000 of whom are employees (House of Commons 
2012). However, the size of the agricultural workforce, and to a much lesser extent food 
processing, varies considerably according to the season. Temporary workers, whether 
recruited directly by an employer or through an agency/‘gangmaster’, are therefore very 
important. For example, it has been estimated that 100,000 workers per week are provided to 
UK farmers and food processors via agencies and gangmasters (Precision Prospecting, 2005).      
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The April 2008 ‘Migration and Labour Shortage Survey’ sought to specifically gauge 
seasonality. It found, based on the sample of 268 farms, that on average a farm will employ 
between 31 (median) and 105 (mean) fewer workers in the low season than in the peak 
season (The significant mean and median difference can be explained by the bifurcated 
structure of the industry: with a large number of small operators employing relatively few 
workers and a small number of large operators with a large staff). Another way of looking at 
this is to construct a ‘peak-season: low-season’ employment ratio. A ratio of 1:1 would mean 
a firm employs the same number of workers all year round; and the higher above one, the 
higher the seasonality in a firm’s labour demand profile. For example, a ratio of 5:1 would 
mean that a firm employs five times more workers in peak season than they do during low 
season. According to the 2008 survey, the average farm will see its workforce grow by 
between four (median average) and seven (mean average) times in moving from low to peak 
season.  
 
It is this seasonality, particularly dramatic in labour-intensive horticulture, that helps one to 
understand the long-running nature of SAWS. The 2008 survey, for instance, uncovered a 
situation in which 73% of respondents had recently experienced seasonal labour shortages, 
against 26% who has experienced year-round shortages (see also NFU, 2013). The issue, 
then, is fundamentally about recruiting migrants to ‘get the harvest in’. What this has meant 
over the past quarter-century is that seasonal labour on farms has internationalized: the 2008 
survey shows that only 16% of peak-season farm workers are now UK-born; and even more 
conservative estimates still put the balance at 56% foreign-born to 44% British-born workers 
(Precision Prospecting, 2005: 17). For comparison, in the 1970s, Newby (1977) found that 
98% of farm workers in England were homegrown. 
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No wonder then that UK farmers have lobbied long and hard for labour-intensive agriculture 
(i.e. mainly horticulture) to be open to temporary migrant workers: with 96% of employers 
arguing that the end of SAWS will have negative consequences for their business (NFU, 
2013). As a caveat, however, it is important to recognize that, whilst extremely important 
during peak employment, SAWS migrants still only makes up a minority of the agricultural 
workforce in the UK (Home Office, 2013: 11). Its role, then, has been very specialist and 
highly seasonal related to the harvesting of particular horticultural crops.   
 
6. The Employer Case for SAWS  
One of the main purposes of the survey and interview-based research was to establish the 
specific nature of the employer case for SAWS in light of its planned closure. 
Notwithstanding the very powerful theoretical critiques of TMWPs, we wanted to use a 
particular historical opportunity – the 2006 decision to end SAWS (by 2011 but then delayed 
until 2014) – to uncover arguments for the food industry being granted a special post-SAWS 
TMWP. We then wanted to reflect on these employer arguments and ask whether there was 
ever justification in supporting TMWPs? The final three sections of the paper reflect this aim. 
The first section outlines the employer case for SAWS as presented via the survey and 
interview responses. The penultimate section of the paper then focuses on specific policy 
recommendations in relation to the scheme. Finally, broad conclusions around the role of 
TMWPs are then reached in order to locate the paper both within the emergent rural 
guestworker literature and within broader research around low-wage and temporary labour 
migration.  
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In simple terms, SAWS was popular because it acted as a form of ‘quality control’ with 
respect to low-wage labour. According to the 2008 employer survey, for instance, the main 
advantage in low-wage peak-season immigration was the superior ‘work-ethic’ that migrants 
brought with them to the farm (see Table 1) (Scott, 2013a, 2013b). This issue of superior 
quality with respect to low-wage migrant workers appeared intimately connected to SAWS, 
rather than genetic. Almost all employers surveyed (75%) stressed how it would be best to 
address future labour shortages primarily through the scheme (see Figure 2). The qualitative 
survey responses (provided via questions 8, 12 and 13) were similarly direct, with the 
following statements indicative:  
‘Removing SAWS is a bloody silly idea!’...’Without SAWS labour our business will 
come to a standstill.’...’Without SAWS we will not have a competitive industry within 5 
years.’...‘SAWS workers are great and by and large, eager and hungry for work. Please 
keep the door wide open!’...‘Farming in the UK will become unviable without SAWS 
being opened up again to non-EU countries.’...‘All SAWS students used during the last 
few years were the best workers ever.’  
If one accepts that the appeal of low-wage migrants is not down to their genes, the question 
becomes one of what makes SAWS, and SAWS workers, so special?  
 
[Table 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
The answer, broadly speaking, is about the ways in which SAWS afforded employers greater 
control over their low-wage labour, on the one hand, and provided them access to a ‘better 
quality’ worker (however defined) than would otherwise be available domestically on the 
other hand (see also Home Office, 2013: 62-66; McCollum and Findlay, 2012). In short, 
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SAWS was widely championed by employers because it gave them greater control over a 
higher calibre of low-wage worker. TMWPs then should be seen as a form of low-wage 
worker ‘quality control’ both in relation to determining who is available for employment and 
in terms of the behaviour of those selected once employed.  
 
One vital element to SAWS in terms of this broad quality control function was the way it 
“tied” (MAC, 2014: 128) workers to their employer: 
‘SAWS is really the best controlled form of immigration that the government has ever 
come up with...SAWS: they don’t leave, they just do not leave, and that security of 
knowing that when you get those peaks during July and Augusts, you know you can at 
rely on that backbone. If we take SAWS away, we don’t have that reliable 
workforce…They’ve the commitment’s, they’re enthusiastic, they want the job more 
than anything. You could argue it’s cos they have no alternative, they’re here on a 
SAWS permit to work for us for over that period…It’s just very, very frustrating from 
our point of view, why take away SAWS, what harm is it doing? It’s a controlled form 
of immigration, it works, it suits the industry, there’s never been any problems with it. 
The only justification is cos the labour’s available within the EU. But as long as you 
have freedom of movement in the EU, which you will always have, you won’t get the 
consistency of SAWS’ (Tomato, cucumber and chilli grower – human resource 
manager) 
So SAWS effectively gave employers a captive workforce whereby migrants’ legal status in 
the UK was closely aligned with their recruitment via one of nine SAWS operators and the 
relationship between this operator and a labour user (i.e. UK farmer).  
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SAWS workers simply “don’t leave” like other workers and this relates to the specific 
features of TMWPs. The tie-in, however, was a complex one. To be sure, it related directly to 
the specificities of the SAWS visa but, more than this, SAWS workers were also provided 
with housing and often transport. This meant that the decision to leave SAWS employment 
effectively meant the loss of one’s home as well as one’s job and legal immigration status. 
Furthermore, SAWS workers were also often recruited via universities and so any poor 
performance would have fed back to their home institution. As one employer explained: ‘I 
mean we were alright with the SAWS. Everybody was happy, everybody knew where they 
were going, and they were properly regulated. If the students did anything wrong, those 
universities tended to get blacklisted and it was so straightforward’ (Tomato farmer).    
 
The language used by respondents was illuminating in respect to this dependence. SAWS 
workers we were told ‘do not abscond’ (survey respondent) and are ‘far less likely to defect’ 
(survey respondent). Whilst no-one is suggesting SAWS workers were forced to work, they 
certainly had few options other than to work for those they were allocated to. The language 
used by respondents is in some way evocative of imprisonment (around defection and 
absconding) and for employers SAWS meant a vital degree of control within a food supply-
chain that was otherwise volatile and unpredictable. One can certainly understand employers 
valuing the certainty provided by SAWS, but the way such TMWPs affects the power 
balance between labour and capital is seen by many as undermining basic human rights 
(Anderson, 2010; Lenard and Straehle, 2012). Not least, SAWS required workers to be 
available to work during a specific time period (up to six months) and they tended to be 
housed on-site to facilitate their flexibility and availability. However, the scheme offered no 
guarantees with respect to how much work would actually be available. 
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SAWS workers may have been easier to control because of the nature of the visa and the 
prevalence of tied housing but this was not the whole story. Many employers also valued 
SAWS workers because they came from countries that were much poorer than the UK. In 
short, it seems that low-wage harvest labour may be more productive when sourced across a 
‘development gap’. As one employer lamented: ‘The decision to exclude Ukraine, Russia, 
Belarus etc. from SAWS has had a devastating effect, particularly as these were the most in 
need of the SAWS experience’ (survey respondent). Put another way, if UK employers can 
recruit workers into low-wage employment who come from poorer countries, and thus move 
across a significant development gap, then the value of the low-wage work they offer may 
actually be relatively high for the worker concerned. Waldinger and Lichter (2003) call this a 
“dual frame of reference” whereby TMWPs enable workers in peripheral economies to 
access the labour markets of core economies but to then transfer part of their income back to 
the periphery where it has more purchasing power (Scott 2013a, 2013b). 
 
Related to this, there was considerable support for a future expansion of SAWS to become a 
global quota-based visa scheme, precisely because those in more peripheral countries were 
seen as potentially very committed low-wage workers (see also Scott 2013b). One employer, 
for instance, remembered a time, before SAWS’ restrictions to A2 workers, when he was able 
to attract students ‘as poor as church mice’ (Manager, Herb Grower) and celebrated the work 
ethic associated with this. Control, then, was not just about tying workers to particular 
employers or simply about workers being dependent upon their employer for housing. It was 
also about SAWS workers coming from countries that were appreciably poorer than the UK 
thus raising the real value of the work on offer.  
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Related to this, it was also clear that as well as being easier to control, SAWS workers also 
brought with them a range of soft and hard skills that made them better employees relative to 
the locally available labour. The following employer experiences of SAWS workers were 
indicative: 
‘You get better labour cos you get students coming over who are more intelligent, who 
could be left autonomously to work doing harvesting and things like that, who are 
degree-educated.’ (Watercress and lettuce grower and processor – human resource 
manager) 
‘They come over here to earn money and learn English, which helps them pay for their 
university training, and hopefully get a good job in their own country’ (survey 
respondent) 
 ‘The students were all studying agricultural related degrees who learnt a lot of 
techniques to take back to their countries. They were motivated to learn about British 
farming, and pleased and proud to be given the opportunity to be in this country’ 
(survey respondent)  
In focusing on SAWS as a form of education, training, work experience and cultural 
exchange, for upwardly mobile young (mainly student) migrants, employers are underlining 
the ways in which TMWPs can be used to attract a much higher calibre of worker than would 
otherwise be possible locally given the wages on offer. Moreover, the costs of initially 
producing this calibre of worker are borne by the sending country.   
 
This is an earlier draft of: Scott, S. (2015) MakiŶg the case for teŵporary ŵigraŶt ǁorker prograŵŵes: eǀideŶce froŵ the UK͛s rural 
guestǁorker ;͚SAWS͛Ϳ scheŵe. JourŶal or ‘ural Studies 4Ϭ: ϭ-11. doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2015.05.005 
 
 
 
 24 
One of the main complaints employers had with respect to SAWS was its post-2007 move 
away from targeting students and young graduates with a commensurate decline in worker 
quality noted:  
‘When we were using Y (a licensed SAWS operator) all the time, it was students, 
students only. Now we can’t guarantee on students. We’ve got mothers and sons 
coming, fathers and sons, fathers and daughters, you know, we’ve getting families over 
now. Last year we had people in their 50s, but unfortunately with the type of work here, 
it is very difficult…Several people did actually stick it out to the end of the season, but 
you’d find the first couple of weeks, it’s torture you know, backbreaking work. They did 
struggle, but you know, it’s a knock-on effect, cos it affects everyone else’s piece-rate, 
you know…And unfortunately last year we had a big problem with like the ages of 
people. We had, you know, non-students which were anything in 30s, 40s, early 50s, 
and like I say, for the type of work on this farm, it’s difficult work.’ (Lettuce grower and 
processor – human resource manager)  
‘Actually what we’ve found, the calibre of people that are coming over are not any more 
the 18 to 24 year old SAWS students that just want to be here for six months or a year 
in-between studying. We’re getting the people that have perhaps not got a job back at 
home, so in Latvia or Lithuania. So they’re needing a lot more hand-holding and work.  
A bit like the British here.’ (Lettuce grower and processor – human resource manager) 
Beyond facilitating employer control, then, SAWS is also about improving worker quality.  
 
A further interesting aspect of this is the way in which low-wage migration through TMWPs, 
like SAWS, regulates the behaviour of domestic workers. One employer observed, for 
instance, that: ‘when SAWS workers have been working with our local workers we have seen 
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a distinct improvement in attitude and productivity’ (survey respondent). Put another way, 
SAWS appears to have raised the bar for some employers in terms of expected practice 
within their workplace. Irrespective of whether this improvement is due to domestic workers 
being motivated by the examples migrants set, or whether they follow out of fear, the results 
can be equally lucrative.  
 
7. Policy Recommendations 
A Temporary Migrant Worker Programme has existed for agricultural employers in the UK 
since 1943. However, following a 2006 government decision, in January 2014 this ‘Seasonal 
Agricultural Workers Scheme’ (SAWS), as it was then known, was discontinued. The main 
argument used to justify its closure was that the UK did not require low-wage workers from 
outside the EU, and that any unmet demand for such workers could now be met from within 
an enlarged EU. There were strong pressures to retain SAWS, principally from the NFU, but 
also from DEFRA (Cabinet Office, 2002; DEFRA, 2010; DEFRA, 2011; NFU, 2011, 2013; 
House of Commons 2009, 2012; House of Lords, 2008). In addition, the 2012/13 Home 
Office review of SAWS found it to be “extremely well managed” (Home Office, 2013: 1) 
and earlier Home Office research similarly found the scheme to be popular and well run 
(Home Office, 2003: 11). 
 
However, academics’ issues with TMWPS like SAWS are manifold. Briefly, temporary visas 
for low-wage workers have been criticized for: creating differential citizenship status and 
rights; legitimizing inequality between workers; underpinning in-work poverty and 
exploitation; generating permanent migration flows; depressing pay and conditions; reducing 
incentives for technological development and diffusion; crowding out would-be domestic 
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workers; underpinning economic dependency in the developing world; and generating brain-
drain from the developing world. This has led many academics to rally against TMWPs per 
se on ideological and theoretical grounds.   
 
Given the evidence reviewed above our view is to, first, not rule out the resurrection of 
SAWS given that academic critiques did not feature prominently in its closure. The left-
leaning think-tank the IPPR, responsible for a great deal of recent UK immigration policy 
development, has recently argued for example that: “In the medium term, the UK should 
consider piloting temporary worker schemes for low or non-skilled migrants from outside the 
UK” (Finch, 2011: 13). Secondly, it is important, in our view, to discuss and debate what 
TMWPs could and should look like if resurrected (see also Ruhs, 2006; Ruhs, 2013).  
 
The first, and not especially costly or onerous step, in this respect should be to make sure 
workers are consulted in any evaluation of a migration policy or scheme. For instance, in the 
time SAWS was running (1943-2014), the views of workers were, according to the Home 
Office, never systematically considered (Home Office, 2013: 64). In fact, we were unable to 
find any independent evidence of what workers thought about SAWS. 
 
The second step in contemplating the reinstatement of a scheme like SAWS is to focus on the 
broad benefits of TMWPs. Briefly, they tend to draw migrants from the economic periphery 
to the core and this bring benefits to the periphery via financial remittances and two-way 
skills transfers. They can also shape the production/ reproduction of workers, with employers 
often noting that TMWPs provide them with ‘better’ (however defined) low-wage 
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employees. Thirdly, TMWPs bring in workers to do jobs that are undesirable, and in the 
process underpin more desirable primary labour markets. Finally, some hope that increasing 
migrant labour flows will eventually lead to the establishment of portable global human 
rights and/ or underpin the global governance of workers. 
 
The challenge for UK policy makers is to be aware of these four ‘wins’, alongside the 
academic critiques of TMWPs, and to develop any resurrected SAWS-type guestworker 
programme accordingly. We are not championing TMWPs as some do (Walmsley and 
Winters, 2005; Walmsley et al., 2007) but are arguing for their limited use with specific 
regulatory oversight (see also Ruhs, 2006, 2013). This stance is pragmatic in the sense that if 
TMWPs are to continue to remain important, and even to be resurrected, we believe it is 
better to engage in debates over what they could and should look like than to critique them 
per se. The latter, to some extent, ignores the dilemmas of policy-makers in the current era of 
managed and expansive immigration (Freeman, 1995, Scott, forthcoming).  
 
As far as SAWS is concerned, and despite reservations about the scheme, we would 
recommend a scaled-down policy rather than the closure of SAWS as happened in 2014. This 
would need to, first and foremost, take on board the interests of rural workers more than has 
been evident in the past. In short, a reincarnated SAWS would be misguided were it to treat 
workers only as ‘commodities’ and/ or ‘guests’. Instead, it would need to establish more 
laudable aims than this, and success would need to be judged against these aims and with 
evidence from scheme participants. Building upon this overall sentiment, nine specific policy 
ideas and recommendations for a rural TMWP are outlined and evidenced in Table 2. It is 
important to be cautious, however, and to agree principles before detail as history, with 
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respect to the pay, conditions and freedoms of rural workers has not been kind (see Anderson, 
2013).  
[Table 2 about here] 
8. Conclusions 
Since the 1990s, international migration has, arguably, been the main process reshaping rural 
areas across the developed world. There has, however, been limited academic attention 
directed towards this, especially in relation to low-wage migrant workers (Dufty-Jones, 
2014). The research gap is in part due to the hidden nature of low-wage work in the 
countryside, and also the associated dominance of idyllic and bucolic representations of 
rurality (see for example, Halfacree, 1996). Recent publications within this journal, however, 
have begun to challenge sanitised constructions of rurality, and address the gaps within the 
literature with respect to rising low-wage immigration into rural areas (Findlay and 
McCollum, 2013; Hanson and Bell, 2007; Rye and Andrzejewska, 2010). The paper has 
contributed to this emerging literature through a specific focus on temporary migrant worker 
programmes (TMWPs) that are orientated towards migrant employment in the food industries 
of the developed world. 
 
One of the central debates in the academic literature revolves around the overall desirability 
of TMWPs. The dominant sentiment amongst academics is a critical one, largely based 
around the way in which TMWPs are used to produce/ reproduce a certain type of 
disempowered worker (Anderson, 2010; Hennebry and McLaughlin, 2012; Lenard and 
Straehle, 2012; Mitchell, 2011; Prebeisch, 2010). Migration policy, in this respect, is 
operationalized in order to produce low-wage, temporary workers who are both ‘good’ 
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(however defined) and easily controlled. To this extent, schemes like SAWS emerge as part 
of a socio-economic strategy initiated by government but underpinned by business interests.    
 
Some academics, irrespective of the ideological and theoretical objections raised, have taken 
a more positive view with respect to TMWPs (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014; Ruhs, 2006, 
2013; Walmsley and Winters, 2005; Walmsley et al., 2007). The positive view varies from 
the embrace and championing of TMWPs to their cautious welcoming, and we fall firmly 
within the latter camp. The argument we would advance is that ideological and theoretical 
critiques of TMWPs can close off debate with respect to how schemes like SAWS could and 
should be constituted, and, that a guarded engagement with TMWPs is more pragmatic, 
realistic and potentially more critically-minded given the dominant expansionist trend in 
migration management over recent decades (Freeman, 1995). In other words, with 
appropriate ‘checks and balances’ in place, TMWPs can be defended.  
 
Moreover, some also argue that, even when TMWPs create different tiers of citizenship and 
different levels of worker and workplace rights and entitlements, they still have a place. The 
question, in light of the evidence presented above, is whether one can have TMWPs like 
SAWS without running against the dominant academic critiques (based largely around 
notions of universal human rights) and whilst also still retaining their economic functionality 
(i.e. producing and reproducing better quality and more easily controllable low-wage 
workers)? Our conclusion, drawing on the specific policy recommendations made above, is 
that TMWPs must, first and foremost, move beyond the view of workers as mere 
‘commodities’ and/ or ‘guests’. In doing so, a degree of economic functionality may well be 
lost but economic functionality alone should not, in any case, shape policy. To be sure, there 
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is not always a trade-off between human rights and economic competitiveness, but there is 
certainly always a debate to be had, in the context of immigration, about what employers 
want out of workers and what it is reasonable to expect workers to give.  
 
Related to this is the broader question of what role states should play in the production and 
reproduction of low-wage labour and how immigration policy fits into this? Certainly, 
TMWPs like SAWS do seem to contribute to both the quality and the control of low-wage 
labour to the benefit of both food producers and food consumers. This quality-control nexus 
also does appear to have convinced many low-wage employers of the value of international 
migration. The issue for academics, however, is where does this take us with respect to the 
longer-term and broader question of ‘what type of work for what type of worker’? There is a 
danger, for example, of loosely regulated TMWPs underpinning a negative spiral of pay and 
conditions. There is also a danger of such schemes sanctioning hugely unequal forms of 
employment and widening the gap between primary and secondary labour. In addition, there 
is the related question of long-term sustainability and acceptability with respect to the rising 
supply, and potential supply, of temporary migrant workers. Specifically, will this de facto 
firm and industry subsidy – which appears to produce/ reproduce ‘better’ low-wage workers 
– always be expansionary (see Freeman, 1995) and what are the negative externalities of this?  
 
Finally, it is apparent that low-wage agricultural and food processing work in developed 
world countries has often had a special place at the migration policy table (see for example 
Hennebry and McLaughlin, 2012). All the evidence, until relatively recently, continued to 
suggest that this food industry ‘exceptionalism’ would remain. However, with SAWS closure 
in 2014, the question is now whether a symbolic turning point has been reached, and if it has, 
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what this means both for low-wage employers and their workers? More broadly, and beyond 
the food industry exceptionalism, will other TMWPs go the way of SAWS? Or does the UK 
case reviewed above reflect a distinct policy-making milieu – especially around rising net 
migration and EU enlargement – that will wane in influence over the medium to long term as 
the ‘guestworker resurrection’ (Castles, 2006) continues?   
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